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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT

-

PROPERTY OF PRISONER IN

OFFICER - C(stodia Legis. - Defendant, indicted for
embezzlement, petitions to compel the return of a sum of money
taken from his person by the arresting officer and now in the custody of the superintendent of the Department of Public Safety.
The superintendent resists the petition on the grounds that a
valid notice of an execution lien has been served on him by third
party claimants, and that the money in controversy is the fruit
of the crime charged. Held, that money taken from the person
of a felony indictee is in custodia legis and not subject to garnishment, attachment or other civil process. State v. George.1
The prevailing authority supports the common law rule advanced in the principal case. 2 The reasons assigned to justify
this result are predicted upon public policy. They may be classified
as follows: (1) the due and orderly administration of criminal
justice without interference, in the nature of collateral proceedings, which might impair the control of the court over its officers
and procedure ;3 (2) the confusion, inconvenience and expense to
which public officers would be put;4 and, (3) the violation of a.
prisoner's rights by opening the door to trumped-up charges, and
collusion between an officer and a creditor, thus undermining the
respect of the people for their courts. 5
A minority of jurisdictions at common law, while recognizing
the preponderant rule generally, have established exceptions to it
when the reason for the rule appears to have ceased.6 It has been
held that the following condition must be present: (1) where there
is no evidence of fraud or collusion and the purpose of the criminal process is clearly bona fide; (2) where the property sought
to be subjected to civil process is the fruit of the crime charged;'
HANDS OF

1 181 S. E. 713 (W. Va. 1935).

2 Hughes v. Svboda, 178 Atl. 108 (Mld. 1935); Outerbridge Horsey Co. v.
Martin, 142 Md. 52, 120 At. 235 (1923); Robinson v. Azel Howard and
Trustee, 61 Mass. 257 (1851); Hubbard v. Garner, 115 Mich. 406, 73 N. W.
390 (1897); Kuehn v. Faulkner, 136 'ash.
676, 241 Pae. 290, 45 A. L. R.
571 (1925).
3 Outerbridge Horsey v. Martin, supra n. 2.
4 Hughes v. Svboda, s'upra n. 2.
GState v. George, sitpra n. 1; 45 A. L. R. 571.
6 Gaston v. Jackson Nat. Bank, 45 Ga. App. 106, 163 S. E. 265 (1932);
Fitzgerald v. Nickerson, 443 R. I. 396, 113 Atl. 290, 16 A. L. R. 373, and
note (1921).
7 Golden Gate Candy Products Co. v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. App. (2d) 426,
36 P. (2d) 834, 48 A. L. R. 835 (1934).
s Fitzgerald v. Nickerson, supra n. 6.
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and (3) where the plaintiff in the civil proceedings is the person
who has suffered the loss of the property by reason of the crime
charged against the prisoner.9 While expressly supporting the
majority view, the California decisions make two additional exceptions to its operation: (1) where the property sought to be garnished was not taken from the prisoner's person but from its resting place elsewhere, at his voluntary suggestion, on the theory
that the officer became merely a bailee in an individual capacity,
and therefore subject to civil process ;10 and (2) where the prisoner
is taken into custody as a fugitive from justice, property found
on his person is subject to execution under a judgment returned
against him because of transactions occurring after his conviction.11
Under statutes in some of the states, property in the possession of a public officer is -subject, at least under certain conditions, to civil process although taken from a person arrested on
a criminal charge.' It has been held that general attachment and
garnishment statutes, however, are not to be construed as applying
to property coming into the hands of an arresting officer. 3
The instant case is a decision of first impression in West Virginia. The reasoning of the court and the rather narrow construction placed upon the principle of custodia legis by decisions in the
past would indicate that a recognition of exceptions to the general
rule is improbable in this state.14 There is no statute which would
warrant a sufficiently broad construction to justify a contrary result in this case. It is well understood that the attachment and
garnishment statutes are construed strictly in West Virginia."'
On principle it would seem that the majority decisions are sound,
since the minority view of necessity requires a determination of
collateral issues, foremost of which would be whether, as a matter
9 Golden Gate Candy Products Co. v. Superior Ct., supra n. 7.
10 Coffee v. Haynes, 124 Cal. 561, 57 Pac. 482 (1899).
However, the court
in this case did say the property in question was in oustodia 1egis.
1 Emmanuel v. Sichofsky, 198 Cal. 713, 247 Pac. 205 (1926).
12x
parte Hum, 92 Ala. 102, 9 So. 515, 13 L. R. A. 120 (1890); Reifsnyder v. Lee, 44 Iowa 101, 24 Am. Rep. 733 (1876); Closson v. Morrison,
47 N. H. 482, 93 Am. Dec. 459 (1867); Fitzgerald v. Nickerson, supra n. 6;
and see 45 A. L. R. 571.
IsKuehn v. Faulkner, supra n. 2.
14 Brewer v. Hutton, 45 W. Va. 106, 30 S. E. 81 (1898) ; Boylan v. Hines,
62 W. Va. 48, 59 S. E. 503 (1907).
'-Altmeyer v. Caulfield, 37 W. Va. 847, 17 S. E. 409 (1893);. Cosner v.
Smith, 36 W. Va. 788, 15 S. E. 977 (1892); Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v.
Rogers, 52 W. Va. 450, 44 S. E. 300 (1903); and see Strauss v. Chesapeake,
etc. R. Co., 7 W. Va. 368, 2 A. L. R. 506n (1874), to the effect that property
not under the control of the defendant cannot be subjected to the levy of
an attachment writ.
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of fact, there was fraud or collusion in procuring criminal process.
The result would inevitably be the thwarting of the ideal of
speedy justice, a tendency to impair respect for criminal proceedings, and to inconvenience public officers. It is believed these considerations outweigh the possible advantages, under the minority
rule, of helping to perfect a third party's civil rights and
remedies.

BANKRUPTCY -

Om AND

GAS - DiscRETioN iN FEDERAL

COURT

TO PERMIT DETERMINATION OF BouNDARms OF BANKRUPT'S LEAsE-

HOLD BY STATE COURT. - The original order to an approved petition in bankruptcy under the provision of Section 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act' enjoined the state court from proceeding further
with a trespass suit to determine the title to certain oil allegedly
removed, by the bankrupt oil company from under plaintiff's land
through a slanting well.2 Held, that on motion to dissolve injunction it was within the discretion of the federal court to permit the
state court to determine ownership of the3 oil, and previous order
so modified. In re Sentinel Oil Company.
This holding seems unusual since the power to pass uniform
bankruptcy laws is given to Congress 4 and it has said expressly
that the federal court shall "have exclusive jurisdicion of the
The cases likewise
debtor and its property wherever located"'
paramount jurisand
exclusive
of
an
state the same broad rule
point in issue,
the
very
this
begs
But
court."
diction in the federal
namely, whether this oil is the debtor's property and more particularly whether a federal or state court shall decide its ownership.
On this question the cases are not in complete harmony. When
a bankruptcy court acquires possession of the property the general
practice is to try all disputed titles by summary proceedings be-

,11
2

U. S. C. A. § 207.
See generally, Lahee, Problems of Crooked Holes (1929)

13 AMERICAN

Ass'N OP PETROLEUM GEOL. BuLL. 1095-1161.
3 In re Sentinel
4 United States

Oil Co., 12 F. Supp. 294 (1935).
Constitution, art. 1, § S.
511 U. S. C. A. § 207(a).
6 Bz parte Baldwin, 291 U. S. 610, 54 S. Ct. 551, 78 L. Ed. 1020 (1934);
Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie and Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734, 51 S. Ct. 270, 75 L. Ed.
645 (1931); Grand Boulevard Inv. Co. v. Strauss, 78 F. (2d) 180 (1935);
In re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734 (1935); Irving Trust Co. v.
Fleming, 73 F. (2d) 423 (1934).
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